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Abstract
An object or value becomes sacred when a person feels compelled to protect and admire it.
When a person holds a Sacred Value (SV) they are less likely to accept compromises, or “taboo
tradeoffs,” to that value and will behave less rationally to protect it from perceived slights.
Though research on SV has replicated well, there has yet to be a popularized scale measuring it.
A previous attempt at developing a multidimensional scale for measuring the degree to which a
person holds any value as sacred was made that resulted in a 15-item measure. Though this
version demonstrated good predictive validity, its psychometric properties were lacking and its
dimensions did not correlate with each other, suggesting that it was not a unified scale of the SV
construct. The present study has re-specified the previous scale into a 35-item SVS that exhibits
improved psychometric properties with factors that correlate well with each other. A path
analysis investigating the predictive utility of the SVS compared to attitude strength and moral
conviction showed that the factors of the SVS differentially predicted resistance to taboo
tradeoffs and willingness to aggress for the sake of one’s SV. Implications and future directions
are discussed.
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Re-Specifying the Sacred Values Scale
A Sacred Value (SV) can be understood as a way of valuing an object, ideal, or concept
in such a way as a person feels compelled to protect and admire it (Sheikh, Ginges, Coman, &
Atran, 2012). One defining feature that is indicative of a SV is when criticism or failing to show
one’s SV proper respect is perceived as an attack. Values of a religious nature are some of the
most obvious examples of SV, however, research has demonstrated that secular concepts can be
“sacralized” to the point that they incite the same kind of fervor as those of a religious nature
(Jassin, Sheikh, Obeid, Argo, & Ginges, 2013). The issue of nuclear power, for example, has
been researched as an emerging SV in The Islamic Republic of Iran (Dehghani, Iliev, Atran,
Ginges, & Medin, 2009). Nuclear power in Iran is a good example of a purely secular SV
because the conflict can clearly be understood as a political rather than a religious issue yet
Iranian proponents of nuclear power defend their position with the same fervor and vitriol that is
characteristic of SV and religious values. Other conflicts over SV, such as the Israeli-Palestinian
war over land, are more difficult to define in purely secular or religious terms. Yet the land that
includes Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip are nonetheless considered sacred to both parties involved
(Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007; Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007). More examples of SV
can be nationalistic and abstract in nature. For example, research suggests that SV in America
tend to be based on activism and universal human rights (Lim & Baron, 1997). Indeed, it is
theoretically possible for anything to be considered sacred.

SACRED VALUES AND THE RATIONAL ACTOR
Much of the earliest research on SV comes from research investigating “intuitive” or
“folk” economics, which can be understood as a decision-making strategy that seeks heuristics to
1

maximize personal wealth and minimize loss (see Rubin, 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, &
Lerner, 2000). Decision-making is aided by flexible folk economic heuristics and becomes
maladaptive when these rules become too rigid. According to this framework, SV can be
explained as a product of moralizing communities who perceive them as necessary components
to maintaining group cohesion (Tetlock, 2003). Furthermore, SV are beneficial for a group but
problematic for the individual because groups seem to necessarily avoid concrete definitions of
SV so as to avoid the risk of devaluing a SV by evoking comparisons with vulgar secular values
(Tetlock 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000).
Indeed research that tries to identify a person’s SV has demonstrated that people will
behave in such a way as to willfully sacrifice their personal success (Atran, & Axelrod, 2008) for
the sake of maintaining the precious and mysterious qualities of their SV (Baron, & Spranca,
1997; Tetlock, 2003). These findings have consistently defied the rational actor model under
which much of the economic research on SV operated. The rational actor model (see Allison, &
Zelikow, 1999) assumes that people, as rational actors, will make decisions that maximize their
personal or group benefits and minimize cost; a corollary to this therefore assumes that all
decisions can be reduced to fungible components. However, this assumption fails where SV are
concerned; as a result, most economic research regards SV as examples of folk economic
heuristics becoming too rigid (see Baron, & Spranca, 1997).
The rational actor model was central to the original conception of SV inasmuch as it
demonstrated a robust and replicable violation of several of its key assumptions. There is a large
body of literature demonstrating that humans do not commonly make decisions according to the
cost-benefit analysis that the rational actor model assumes (see Monroe, & Maher, 1995 for
review). The rational actor model assumes that people act according to stable, self-determined,
2

and self-interested goals and that they pursue these goals in such a way as to maximize their
benefits and minimize their costs. The rational actor model works well to describe decisionmaking for highly structured economic decisions, but it fails to describe the behavior of everyday
decision-makers (see Geva, & Mintz, 1997; Hechter, 1994; Smith, 1991). A particularly potent
area where the rational actor model has failed to describe behavior has been in conflict resolution
where a SV are involved.
Conflict resolution is notoriously difficult when the conflict is based on opposing values
(Illes, Ellemers, & Harinck, 2014). When a conflict is framed as being centered on values, as
opposed to interests, parties report feeling more self-involved and having less common ground
with perceived opponents (Kouzakova, Ellemers, Harinck, & Scheepers, 2012). Additionally,
value-based conflicts have been shown to have a stronger association with prejudice against
opposing parties, even when controlling for system justification, social-dominance orientation,
and modern racism (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013). Traditionally, the rational actor
model assumes that conflict results from one party interrupting another’s pursuit of a goal (see
Clarke, 1993). Moreover, the rational actor model tends to reduce conflict resolution strategies
to 3 basic choices: to take no action, to demand incentive before conceding, or to resort to
violence (Lalman, 1988). This model assumes that fungible compensations are viable options
for conflict resolution and a viable option for deescalating conflict. However, though this may
be true of instrumental conflicts, this strategy notoriously backfires when it is applied to conflicts
over SV.

The backfire effect & symbolic gestures of respect.
The discovery that SV conflicts tend to become agitated when fungible compensation is
offered was first explored empirically by investigating conflict over sacred land. The most
3

salient example of land becoming sacralized is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over in the Middle
East.

This political conflict can be understood as a border dispute between the recently

established State of Israel and the de jure State of Palestine (Tessler, 1994), however this conflict
has roots in a much larger ethnic and religious tensions between Jewish-Israelis and MuslimArabs. Considering how volatile this conflict has become over what is mostly a political dispute
about land in central Israel (indeed, much of the dispute is over water rights, and infrastructure),
researchers have begun investigating the land per se as a SV (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki,
2007).
Ginges and colleagues (2007), who sampled from Israel and Palestine, had participants
engage in hypothetical peace deals wherein participants considered 1 of 3 solutions to the
conflict: first, a taboo solution involved participants rescinding their rights to 99% of the
disputed land. Second, a taboo+ solution that involved participants rescinding their rights to
99% of the disputed land in exchange for monetary compensation. Finally, a symbolic solution
where no land is relinquished but the opposing party concedes that the claim to the land is
legitimate and apologizes for their part in the conflict. The rational actor model predicts that
participants should express more support for the taboo+ condition than the taboo condition since
the former involves a fungible compensation that the latter does not. However, their results
showed that participants endorsed violence more often in the taboo+ compared to the taboo
condition. Contrary to the rational actor model, participants were more upset by being offered
money in exchange for compromising on their SV than when monetary compensation was not
offered (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007). This finding, termed the backfire effect, has
been conceptually replicated (see Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007) with other religiously oriented
SV such as adherence to Sharia Law in Indonesia (Ginges, & Atran, 2009), and the religious
4

conflicts in India (Sachdeva, & Medin, 2009). The backfire effect was also observed in the
secular conflict over nuclear power in Iran (Dehghani, Iliev, Atran, Ginges, & Medin, 2009).
However, beyond merely demonstrating that SV conflicts are agitated when fungible
compensation is introduced, research also demonstrates that symbolic gestures of respect alone
can work towards ameliorating tensions.

To return to the above study, participants who

considered the symbolic solution were less supportive of violence compared to the other
conditions (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007). This not only demonstrates that adherents
to a SV experience moral outrage when material incentives are offered in exchange for
compromising their SV, but also that adherents may be pacified merely by showing respect to
their SV.

This further contrasts SV from the rational actor model by demonstrating that

increasing utility in exchange for compromising a SV leads to increased endorsement of
violence, but also that decreasing utility (or otherwise keeping it static) can pacify conflicts over
an SV—given that their SV is duly respected. This feature of SV has important implications for
resolving long-standing cultural conflicts that are centered on one or more SV (see Atran, 2012).

From rational actors to devoted actors.
Despite the fact that the rational actor model reliably describes human behavior under
rigid circumstances where the concept of utility is highly salient, psychologists have frequently
demonstrated that people do not always act as the “utility maximizers” that the rational actor
model assumes (see Monroe, & Maher, 1995). Thus far, SV has been characterized as a notable
and predictable violation of the rational actor model, this has inspired the term devoted actors to
explain the behavior of those people who adhere to a SV to the degree that they are endorse
absolute and extreme commitment to it (Atran, Sheikh, & Gomez, 2014a; 2014b; Atran, &
Ginges, 2015). It should be noted that, for the purposes of this manuscript, the term adherent
5

refers to any person who endorses an SV while a devoted actor will refer exclusively to the
subset of adherents who carry their commitment to a SV to the point of extremism.
A devoted actor can be understood as irrationally dedicated to a SV to the point that likeminded people are idealized, and fighting or dying for a SV is romanticized and considered
preferable to allowing an SV to be devalued (Atran, Sheikh, & Gómez, 2014b). Atran and
colleagues (2014) review a line of research suggesting that devoted actors are created via a very
strong group component that works first: to rally adherents of a SV together, and second: to
emphasize the cohesiveness of this group such that the SV becomes at once central and
peripheral to the group. That is to say, a group of devoted actors would have no cohesion
without their SV so protecting the group becomes the prime motivator for individuals within the
group. However, though groups of like-minded thinkers are important to devoted actors, their
desire to maintain group cohesion cannot be better explained by mere conformity, dissonance, or
other psychological constructs that tend to contribute to “group thinking” (Atran, Sheikh, &
Gómez, 2014b).
The degree to which someone who adheres to a SV is distinct from someone who is a
devoted actor remains unclear, but identifying when this transition occurs has the potential to
explain a large variety of extreme decision-making. Such a discovery could help explain why
some people are willing to kill or even die for a cause while others are not. Research has begun
to investigate possible individual difference variables that distinguish adherents from devoted
actors. A possible variable that seems to distinguish adherents from devoted actors is that
devoted actors tend to fuse their identities with other devoted actors. A person has a fused
identity when their group membership and personal identity become indistinguishable (see
Swann, & Buhrmester, 2015; Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales, & Huici, 2009). Atran, Sheikh,
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and Gómez (2014a; 2014b) found that participants who expressed an unconditional commitment
to a SV and who endorsed a fused identity were more likely to endorse a willingness to make
personal sacrifices for the sake of their SV as well as for the sake of those people to whom they
considered themselves fused.

TABOO TRADEOFFS
Being able to tradeoff, or make compromises on one’s wants or needs, is another
assumption of economic research, violations of which the rational actor model cannot account
(c.f., McFadden, 1999; Verhallen, & van Raaij, 1986). The ability to discover maximally
optimal options during times of conflict or crisis presupposes that people will be willing to
sacrifice any or all values in circumstances that necessitate it. Yet, research has frequently
demonstrated that these tradeoffs become problematic when psychological variables are
accounted for (see Förster, Higgins, & Bianco, 2003; Luce, Payne, & Bettman, 1999; Monroe, &
Maher, 1995). Most economic researchers seem to be in agreement that tradeoff reasoning may
be best modeled by a modern rational actor model that controls for psychological mediators of
decision-making (e.g., Mercer, 2005; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). However,
even adapted models of economic reasoning tend to fail to predict behaviors when they are
focused on a SV.
In a study by McGraw and Tetlock (2005), participants refused to consider selling a
ballpoint pen when it was imbued with a SV; participants more frequently refused to respond to
the solicitation and reported that they were insulted by the solicitation. Moreover, this effect was
increased when participants knew that the solicitor had knowledge that the pen was imbued with
their SV. This study demonstrates participants’ inability to tradeoff where SV are concerned.
Indeed, according to Tetlock (2003), the nature of SV dictates that tradeoffs should be
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unconscionable. Thus, tradeoffs where SV are concerned are considered taboo. The idea of
taboo tradeoffs follows from the observation that SV tend to resist comparisons with lesser
values. That is to say, adherents to a SV will refuse to compare their SV with other non-sacred
values; moreover such comparisons are known to be difficult for adherents to comprehend (see
also Fiske, & Tetlock 1997). Making such comparisons are likened to the difficulty that people
have in making inter-dimensional comparisons in general (see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson,
1992; Pinkal, 1990). To borrow Tetlock and colleagues’ example (2000), it would be difficult to
compare a fungible good like a car with a SV like love, it is possible to price and scrutinize the
price of a car but how would this be accomplished for something like love? Additionally, the
nature of a taboo tradeoff is not only the result of finding comparisons between SV and other
values difficult. But it is also true that such comparisons should elicit a negative affect such that
it should be considered “shameful” for one to make such a comparison (i.e., paying for a car with
love; Fiske, & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000).

RELIGION AND MORALITY FAIL TO CONSISTENTLY PREDICT AGGRESSION
The utility of understanding SV lays largely in the construct’s ability to predict hostility
and aggression when those values are challenged—and using that insight as a bridge for more
peaceful relations (see Atran, & Axelrod, 2008). However, because SV can be so closely tied to
religious or moral issues, one might naturally question the necessity of SV as a construct and
insist that research on morality or religion would be sufficient to predict value-based aggression
(c.f., Sheikh, Ginges, Coman, & Atran, 2012). However, research on religion and morality have
had mixed results in their ability to predict aggression. Most research on religion and aggression
has found that above average frequency of religious service attendance (as opposed to above
average prayer) is a significant predictor of aggression—but only for highly submissive
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participants (Saraglou, Corneille, & Van Cappellen, 2009; Van Capellen, Corneille, Cols, &
Saroglou, 2011). Other research, for example, found that priming for religion only predicted
aggression when participants felt justified in their actions (McKay, Efferson, Whitehouse, &
Fehr, 2010). Indeed research investigating the relationship between religion and aggression tend
to find only conditional effects.
Investigating the relationship between morality and value-based aggression is difficult.
Research suggests that aggression is moderated by moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999;
Caprara, Tisak, Alessandri, Fontaine, Fida, & Paciello, 2014; Li, Nie, Boardley, Situ, & Dou,
2014), which seems to counter the idea that morality can justify aggression. However, more
complicated experimental designs suggest that moral disengagement will increase aggression
only in certain situational contexts (White-Ajmani, & Bursik, 2014). This conditional pattern of
association is similar to that of the relationship between religion and aggression: with morality
discouraging aggression in some situations yet encouraging aggression in other situations (see
also Bouhana, & Wikström, 2008; Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, & Trafimow, 2002; Skitka,
& Mullen, 2002; Wohl, & Reeder, 2004). Indeed the relationship between religion, morality,
and aggression is not as clear as one might think. Further exacerbating the confusion between
SV and religion is research demonstrating how interrelated SV are with religious values. In one
study by Sheikh and colleagues (2012) it was found that the more a person participated in
religious rituals the more likely they were to endorse a preference (e.g., preferring Macintosh to
Windows computers) as a SV. Moreover, they found that priming participants for religious
rituals increased the number of SV that person espoused.
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Separating SV, religion, and aggression.
The relationship between SV, religion, and aggression seems intractable, but two key
postulates may help to establish the boundary between religious values and SV and between SV
and aggression. First, it is important to maintain that all religious values are SV but not all SV
are religious values. Second, it becomes useful to remember that having a SV may be necessary
but not sufficient for a person to aggress over their SV. The proposed threshold between SV
adherents and devoted actors is an important distinction that establishes a theoretical limit
between when people regard their SV as personally important, and when people will begin to act
irrationally to defend it from perceived affronts (Atran, Sheikh, & Gomez, 2014a; 2014b; Atran,
& Ginges, 2015).
It is important to note, that one of the defining aspects to becoming a devoted actor
involves a commitment to not only one’s SV, but to the group of like-minded people. Group
cohesion for devoted actors is entirely dependent on an SV, but as long as cohesion is maintained
devoted actors will openly declare their willingness to fight for or die for other devoted actors.
When considered in this light, it seems reasonable to suggest that when people are primed for
religion they might be effectively primed to feel the same extreme, conditional group cohesion to
their religious group that devoted actors experience for other devoted actors.

Indeed this

assertion seems bolstered by the finding that the relationship between religious ritual and
sacralizing values is catalyzed when participants are additionally primed to experience a threat to
their in-group (i.e., their religious group; Sheikh, Ginges, Coman, & Atran, 2012). Thus, it is
reasonable to maintain that, though religious values are readily accessible as SV, the universe of
SV can potentially include values that are not religious. Therefore a measure of SV that is
independent of religious concepts is necessary to investigate the nature of SV per se.
10

MEASURING SACRED VALUES
Robust and replicable predictions have been demonstrated in the literature by identifying
a community with one or many SV. However, because of the variable nature of the construct,
there has yet to be a unitary definition of the factors that define SV. There are, however, some
concepts that are widely agreed indicators of SV, a subset of which have been formalized into a
theoretical model of SV with 3 proposed components (Tetlock, 2000). These 3 theoretical
components have been researched individually, but there presently exists no psychometric scale
that measures these 3 dimensions in conjunction with each other. Thus, this theoretical
framework seems like a natural model from which a multidimensional psychometric assessment
of SV may be developed.

The Sacred Value Protection Model.
Originally conceived by Tetlock and colleagues (2000), the Sacred Value Protection
model (SVPM) emphasizes that, adherents to a SV fight a cognitive battle between protecting
their SV from outside corruption and policing their own thoughts and actions from tainting the
SV. This battle is exacerbated, however, because SV tend to be highly salient but loosely
defined; so the adherent is stuck between a legitimate desire to protect their SV and the idea that
identifying what makes an SV worth protecting is itself problematic. Adherents of a SV under
this model can perceive themselves as both guardian of and liability to their SV at the same time.
The SVPM hypothesizes that SV can be captured by 3 interrelated “propositions” which Tetlock
(2000) termed: Moral outrage, moral cleansing, and reality constraint.

11

Moral outrage.
When a community member or some outside force threatens a SV, Tetlock and
colleagues (2000; Tetlock, 2002; 2003) propose that adherents will experience an “aversive
arousal state,” which he calls moral outrage. The concept of moral outrage, according to this
model, involves derogating those who threaten SV, holding such people in contempt and
publically expressing anger at them. Conversely, when moral outrage is salient, adherents
perceive enforcing the SV as a social norm as a public duty and will display enthusiasm for those
who take on the role of enforcing the SV norm. Because enforcing SV norms is perceived as a
public duty, adherents who do not take up the cause of enforcing this norm are perceived as
threatening to the SV and themselves become targets of derision. Ancillary to this idea is the
suggestion that moral outrage might also involve a group cohesive component such that
individuals who appropriately defend or otherwise represent their SV should be lionized
(Tetlock, 2002).
Tetlock and colleagues (2000) also maintain that moral outrage can be triggered by “the
logic of constitutive incommensurability” (p. 855), or the idea that merely comparing a SV to
lesser instrumental or economic values irrevocably damages it. According to the SVPM the
longer an adherent exists in a state of moral outrage, the more risk exists that a SV will be
compromised. Moreover, under this model, violations to an SV are additive such that the longer
one entertains thoughts that are contrary to their SV the more damage they will do to their
personal character—regardless of whether that person acts in a way that is contrary to their SV.

Moral cleansing.
Indeed, moral outrage need not be triggered by an external actor or even by a concrete
action. According the SVPM adherents to a SV take on the role of policing their own and others
12

thoughts to ensure that they do not threaten their SV. Tetlock (2000; 2003) argues that moral
outrage can be triggered by merely entertaining thoughts of compromising a SV regardless of
whether those thoughts were triggered from an external source. Similar to moral outrage, moral
cleansing includes an ancillary pro-social component such that enforcing correct thinking about a
SV is thought to affirm oneself to a social group and that there should be as much distance
between sources of confusion regarding SV. As such, the SVPM alludes that moral cleansing
should involve becoming as close as possible to people who think appropriately about an SV, as
well as distancing one’s self (physically or psychologically) from people who do not agree with
their SV (Tetlock, 2002).
Adherents of a SV should consider compromises to their SV cognitively confusing and
morally distressing. Moreover, Tetlock (2000; 2003) argues that adherents will be motivated to
remove morally outrageous thoughts, in themselves and in others, as quickly as possible so as to
avoid even the risk of entertaining them seriously. Like moral outrage, the SVPM asserts that
contrary thoughts and opinions are damaging to SV such that the longer they are entertained the
more severe the violation. Moreover, the SVPM asserts that adherents to a SV are not only
negatively aroused by thoughts that are contrary to an SV, but are also positively motivated to
engage in thinking that is aligned with their SV. According to the SVPM, this requires thinking
that there exists no real problem that absolutely necessitates compromising a SV.

Reality-constraint.
The SVPM posits that adherents to a SV are sincere in their beliefs that nothing should
threaten or compromise their SV in any way. However, practically, an absolute commitment to
protecting one’s SV would require framing one’s entire life around maintaining and protecting
their SV at the consequence of neglecting one’s day-to-day commitments (Tetlock, 2003). To
13

borrow an analogy from Tetlock (2003), though parents frequently hold their children’s
protection as sacred, an absolute dedication to this SV would demand spending their entire net
worth towards maintaining their child’s safety.

As another example, though national

governments typically regard a robust and efficacious health-care system as sacred, an absolute
dedication to this SV would demand the whole of that nation’s GDP. In truth, the SVPM argues
that—although adherent’s may be genuine in their beliefs that their SV is above all
compromise—in reality, small day-to-day compromises of an adherent’s SV is commonplace.
This becomes problematic in relation to the first 2 components of SV, according to the SVPM,
because consciously considering that one might need to compromise a SV for the sake of their
own survival—or for the sake of convenience—should elicit moral outrage and thereby motivate
moral cleansing.
The resolution to this disconnect is that, according the SVPM, adherents of a SV will
resort to cognitive reframing of day-to-day problems such that they are not truly compromising
their SV. Tetlock (2003) argues that adherents of a SV will prefer to distract one’s self from the
truth that they are not absolute in their devotion to their SV through the use of “rhetorical
smokescreens” (p. 321) and cognitive gaze-aversion. An example of this is when adherents will
reframe their daily compromises of their SV by reframing such compromises as pitting one SV
against another. To elaborate upon the examples provided above: when a parent is met by the
fact that they cannot dedicate their entire net worth towards protecting their child’s safety, the
parent may experience relief by considering that absolute dedication to their child safety would
hurt another SV—which could be anything from the child’s nutrition, sense of security, or
independence. According to Tetlock (2003) these “routine trade-offs,” or framing daily conflicts
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as pitting one SV against another, are commonplace and work to mitigate an over activation of
the moral outrage and cleansing systems to allow for day-to-day functioning.

Taboo tradeoffs & willingness to aggress: indicators or outcomes?
There has been much research predicting resistance to so-called taboo tradeoffs (e.g.,
Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007; McGraw, & Tetlock; 2005), as well as participants’
willingness to argue, fight, and die (collectively: “willingness to aggress”) for the sake of their
SV (e.g., Sheikh, Ginges, Coman, & Atran, 2012). When endeavoring to measure SV it is
debatable whether taboo tradeoffs and willingness to aggress are indicative or predictive of SV
per se. That is to say, whether measures of SV should directly measure participants’ resistance
to taboo tradeoffs and willingness to aggress, or whether such a measure should predict these.
This line of reasoning comes directly from the debate regarding two popular measures of
psychopathy and whether it is appropriate for a measures of psychopathy to include a component
that measures past criminal activity, and then use that measure to predict future criminal activity
(see Skeem, & Cooke, 2010a). The debate therein is whether such a measure would reflect that
the construct psychopathy per se is predicting future criminality or whether the past-criminal
component is predicting future criminality (for a more complete view of this debate see also
Hare, & Neumann, 2010; and Skeem, & Cooke, 2010b). It was subsequently decided that items
representing participants’ resistance to taboo tradeoffs and willingness to aggress should not be
included in a measure of SV (Neria, Ochoa, & Pando, 2014).

AN OBJECTIVE MEASURE OF SACRED VALUES
At present, the methods for identifying and researching SV rely on qualitative
assessments on the part of the researcher.

Typically, researchers have relied on regional
15

expertise to identify a SV to study and, as of yet, there has been no widely adopted objective
measure of SV. Moreover, previous research has yet to investigate SV per se as a psychological
construct. Plenty of empirical research exists demonstrating the predictive utility of subjectively
identified SV (e.g., Atran, Axelrod., & Davis, 2007; Dehghani, Iliev, Atran, Ginges, & Medin,
2009; Ginges, & Atran, 2009; Lim, & Baron, 1997; Sachdeva, & Medin, 2009; Sheikh, Ginges,
Coman, & Atran, 2012). Moreover, there exists theoretical accounts of the ontogeny of SV from
an evolutionary perspective (e.g., Atran, & Ginges, 2015; Atran, Sheikh, & Gómez, 2014a;
Ginges, & Atran, 2014; Graham, & Haidt, 2011; Atran, & Ginges, 2012). However, there has
been little to no work describing what sacred values are psychometrically nor has there been any
work testing the existing theoretical conceptions of SV (e.g., Tetlock; 2003; Tetlock, Kristel,
Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) in a factor analytic framework. One recent attempt has been
made, however, to develop a psychometrically sound scale for measuring the degree to which a
person holds a value to be sacred (Neria, Ochoa, & Pando, 2014).
In 2 studies, a total of 65 items were created with the SVPM (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson,
Green, & Lerner, 2000) in mind, these items were reduced into a 15-item measure that was
intended to measure the magnitude to which a certain value has been sacralized. The first study
involved item creation, reduction, and exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the measure; and the
second study involved confirming the internal consistency and validating the measure. The
results of these studies were mixed: although the 15-item measure demonstrated good predictive
validity, the 5 extracted factors exhibited poor internal consistency.

THE PRESENT STUDY
Considering that the first attempt at constructing a Sacred Values Scale (SVS) still
managed to demonstrate predictive validity despite the mistakes that were made during its
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development suggest that the scale is likely capturing the SV construct. Therefore, the present
study is intended to return to the dataset that was collected on the 65 candidate SVS items and
repeat the scale construction process in a more systematic fashion the result of which should
yield a more internally consistent measure of SV.

Specific Aims.
The goals of the current project are: (1) to return to the original 65 candidate items of the
SVS consider re-specifying the model to develop one with more internally consistent factors; (2)
confirm this new re-specified scale behaviorally and psychometrically by replicating the
procedures in Neria, Ochoa, & Pando (2014).
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Study 1 – Revisiting the original 65 items
A total of 65 items were written to reflect the SVPM in Neria, Ochoa, and Pando (2014),
15 of which were used to demonstrate the predictive utility of an objective measure of SV. It
was intended for this measure to predict resistance to taboo tradeoffs as well as willingness to
aggress. See Table 1 for the original pool of 65 items. The measure used by Neria, Ochoa, and
Pando (2014) demonstrated good predictive utility by predicting the participants’ problemattribution as well as self-report willingness to argue, fight, and die for their SV all of which
support previous research. However, the 15-item measure provided only partial support of the
hypotheses for the taboo tradeoff scenario, which may have been the result of a poor choice of
items that constituted the 15-item measure (Neria, Ochoa,. & Pando, 2014). Thus, the present
study will re-analyze the initial pool of 65 items to create a psychometrically sound
multidimensional SVS.

It is assumed that the SVS will be a hierarchical model with the

individual items being indicators of sub-factors representing different dimensions of a higherorder SV factor. Specifically, it is expected that a 3-factor model should emerge reflecting moral
outrage, moral cleansing, and reality constraint, consistent with the SVPM (Tetlock, Kristel,
Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000).
To help ensure that the SVS represents a unitary measure of SV, and because the SVS is
expected to exhibit a hierarchical factor structure, item reduction will commence with a topdown procedure (Goldberg, 2006). This technique simply involves fitting a 1-factor Principal
Components Analysis (PCA) and removing items that do not load strongly onto the general
factor before commencing with factor analyses to identify sub-factors (see also Waller, 2007). In
so doing, scale development may commence by immediately removing those items which do not
to a higher order factor before proceeding to identify the lower-order factors. This theoretically
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removes troublesome items that may not indicate a higher-order factor before they are given the
opportunity to load onto a lower-order factor and thus is thought to assist with ensuring the unity
of a hierarchical scale.

METHODS

Participants.
Study 1 is a secondary analysis of data collected from the 295 viable participants sampled
in Neria, Ochoa, and Pando (2014; sample 1). A total of 359 participants were collected (153
men, 172 women,

= 35.30), of these 64 were omitted for failing any of 2 attention probe

items, yielding a final sample of 295 participants. Participants were recruited from across The
United States via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were compensated $0.50 for
completing the study. Ethnicity was reported as 73.6% European, 11.7% African, 4.9% Latin,
3.9% South Asian, 2.9% East Asian, 0.7% Native American, 0.3% Middle Eastern, and 2% other
heritage.

Measures & procedure.
Participants were recruited from across The United States via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (Mturk; www.mturk.com) and then immediately directed to the online survey platform
Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Participants first received an informed consent screen, followed
by the full battery of 65 candidate-items in random order, the study concluded with a basic
demographics questionnaire.
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RESULTS

Item Reduction & Dimensionality.
An un-rotated Principal Components Analysis (PCA) constrained to a 1-factor solution
was run in IBM SPSS (version 22.0) to assess whether the SVS-65 reflected a uniform measure.
Items that loaded poorly onto a 1-factor solution (i.e.,

> 0.4) were deleted. This process was

repeated until no items loaded below the minimum threshold. At this step a total of 15 items
were deleted. After this, a Horn’s parallel analysis was conducted in R (version 2.15.3; R Core
Team, 2013) the results of which indicated a 5-factor model was appropriate (see Table 2). This
is contrary to our hypothesis, which predicted a 3-factor solution according to the SVPM. But it
is consistent with pilot studies that also found a 5-factor solution (Neria, Ochoa, & Pando, 2014).
This was followed by an oblimin-rotated Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) in Mplus
(version 7.11; Muthén, & Muthén, 1998-2012) constrained to 5-factors using a weighted least
squares with mean and variance adjustment (WLSMV) estimator. Items were deleted if they
loaded poorly ( > 0.4) or if they loaded to more than one factor (within .15 of each other), this
process was repeated until there were no weak- or double-loadings. Another 15 items were
deleted at this step yielding a total of 35 items remaining.
The final step in re-specifying the SVS involved running an un-rotated PCA constrained
to 1-factor for each of the 5 factors. Items that loaded poorly were going to be deleted, however,
none of the 5 extracted factors exhibited weak- or double-loadings so further item reduction
could not be justified. Table 3 shows the initial Eigenvalues and percent of variance explained
by an oblimin-rotated EFA on the final set of 35 items including. The Eigenvalues stop being
greater than 1 at the fifth extracted component, suggesting a 5-factor solution, and the cumulative
variance explained by the 5-factor solution is 57.26%. Table 4 shows the final set of items for
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the SVS along with the associated factor loadings from the final EFA, as well as the subsequent
CFA that was conducted in a second sample (forthcoming).

DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to address these issues directly with the intention of
creating a new scale that is an improvement in (1) theoretical consistency with established
research on SV and (2) internal consistency of the subscales. Though the SVPM suggests there
should be 3 factors, the SVS still exhibits a factor structure that is more in line with the SVPM if
we divide two of the SVPM factors (i.e., moral outrage, and moral cleansing) into components
that reflect an emphasis on group cohesion. The SVPM discusses the group cohesiveness
components of moral outrage and moral cleansing as though they are ancillary to their respective
factors (see Tetlock 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). However, the results
of this study suggest that a greater emphasis on group-cohesion may be appropriate to indicate
SV.

The factor structure of the SVS.
The SVPM (Tetlock 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) posits that SV
can be indicated by 3 components: Moral outrage, moral cleansing, and reality constraint.
However, both moral outrage and moral cleansing were theorized as having two distinct
manifestations. For one, moral outrage was discussed as experiencing an aversive arousal state
when an SV in challenged as well as enthusiastic support for those who enforce SV as a norm.
Thus, in essence, moral outrage can be thought of as two components: one that reflects a
person’s aversion towards having their SV challenged externally, and one that reflects an
attraction towards those people who would enforce SV as a norm. Likewise, moral cleansing
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was discussed as experiencing a desire to enforce correct thinking about a SV in one’s self as
well as in others. In this way, moral cleansing can be understood as two components of the same
basic concept. The SVS exhibits a 5-factor solution that is theoretically consistent with the
SVPM, but which seems to delineate between the secondary aspects of moral outrage and
cleansing.

Moral outrage becomes Moral Aversion & Support.
As can be seen in Table 4, Factors 1 and 3 both represent different aspects of moral
outrage according to Tetlock (2003). Factor 1 (which consists of 10 items) reflects the basic
premise that adherents to a SV should feel aversively aroused by an external challenge to their
SV. Items in this subscale reflect a desire to derogate people who might challenge their SV (e.g.,
“Criticizing SV is stupid”), holding such people in contempt (e.g., “I am suspicious of anyone
that talks bad about SV”), expressing anger at such people (e.g., “I would feel angry if someone
attacked SV”), and expressing a duty to protect SV (i.e., “People who make SV look bad should
be stopped immediately”). Factor 3 (which consists of 6 items), however, seems to represent a
complementary aspect of moral outrage; whereas Factor 1 represents an aversion for challenging
SV, Factor 3 seems to reflect an attraction towards people and activates that support or protect
SV.
When Tetlock and colleagues (2000) proposed the SVPM they theorized that moral
outrage would manifest itself as both an aversion for things that are contrary to an SV as well as
an attraction, or “enthusiastic support” (p. 855) for enforcing SV as a social norm. This groupcohesion component of moral outrage has been discussed but de-emphasized (see Fiske, &
Tetlock, 1997), however, the results of this factor analysis suggest that this dimension of moral
outrage deserves to be indicative of SV. Items in factor 3 reflect a sense of veneration towards
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people who are highly identified with their SV (e.g., “I admire the people who created SV”) and
support for activities that encourage their SV (e.g., “I welcome any opportunity to learn more
about SV”). Factor 3 seems to represent this component of moral outrage inasmuch as it
represents a desire to support or protect their SV, but it does not seem to represent the concept of
“punishing violators” (p. 855) or those who insufficiently defend their SV. Because Factor 1
consists of those items that reflect a dislike of things and people that are contrary to SV, the
factor has been termed Moral Outrage – Aversion (MA). Similarly, because Factor 3 consists of
those items that represent a desire to encourage SV and lionize those who are emblematic of SV,
the factor has been termed Moral Outrage – Support (MS).

Moral cleansing becomes Moral Induction & Exclusion.
Consistent with the SVPM, factors 4 and 5 both seem to involve items that encourage
correct, or similar, thinking about a SV.

However, the factors deviate slightly from the

conception as it was originally theorized. Rather than reflect an inherent desire to maintain
correct thinking about an SV in one’s self and in others, factors 4 and 5 seem to represent a
desire to encourage the teaching of an SV as well as a desire to remain in the company of
likeminded adherents of a SV. Factor 4 (which consists of 6 items) represents the idea that
people should be taught about SV (e.g., “Everyone should be taught about SV at some point”)
and that people should have a correct comprehension of SV and its significance (e.g., “The world
would be better if more people truly understood SV”).
Moreover, factor 5 (which consists of 5 items) represents the degree to which the
participant enjoys, or would enjoy, being in exclusive company of people who think similarly
about SV. This concept has been alluded to in discussion about moral cleaning (Tetlock, 2002),
but like the group-cohesion component of moral outrage (support) this concept has been de23

emphasized. However, the results of this factor analysis suggest that this group component to
moral cleansing is a theoretically important indicator of SV. Items in this subscale represent a
desire to be in the company of people who have the same understanding of their SV (e.g., “I like
being around people who think the same way about SV as I do”) as well as an aversion towards
being in the company of people who are antagonistic of their SV (e.g., “I would be
uncomfortable around people who hated SV”). Because factor 4 consists of items that encourage
both teaching and a correct appreciation of a SV, this factor has been termed Moral Induction
(MI). Likewise, because factor 5 consists of items that represent a participants desire to be
around others who think similarly about SV and avoid those who think differently about SV, this
factor has been termed Moral Exclusion (ME).

Reality constraint.
Tetlock and colleagues (2000) contend that people are sincere in their beliefs that their
SV is unique and superior to material values and will therefore resist the idea that they might
have to compromise on their SV from time to time. The solution to this, according to the SVPM,
is to distract one’s self from the reality that total adherence to a SV is practically impossible by
engaging in “rhetorical smokescreens” that phrase one’s SV is absolutely intractable. The
concept of reality constraint, according to the SVPM, also includes 2 aspects such that adherents
will unduly idealize their SV and fail to recognize circumstances wherein compromising a SV
might be necessary. However, only factor 2 seems to represent the reality constraint (RC)
component of the SVPM and, moreover, it only seems to reflect a persons’ tendency to idealize
their SV. Items in factor 2 endorse an opinion that their SV in unique and good (e.g., “There is
something special about SV that cannot be found elsewhere”), impactful (e.g., “SV has caused
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some amazing things”), and personally significant (e.g., “My life would be worse off without
SV”).

Study 1 conclusions.
Re-specifying the SVS yielded a factor structure that was theoretically appropriate.
However, to assess internal consistency and predictive utility a second sample was collected.
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Study 2 – A Confirmatory Model & Predictive Validity of the SVS
Confirming the SVS will involve assessing convergent validity of the SVS with a
measure of attitude strength and moral conviction for an SVS. The procedures for this study
were borrowed from Neria, Pando, and Ochoa (2014; sample 2), which represented the first
attempt at generating an objective SVS. A 5-item Attitude Strength questionnaire designed by
Lavine and colleagues (1998) was employed, followed by Skitka and colleague’s (2005) 4-item
Moral Conviction scale. The SVS was expected to be strongly associated with both attitude
strength and moral conviction, while also uniquely predicting resistance to taboo tradeoffs, and
willingness to aggress. Further, to assess discriminant validity participants were exposed to the
SVS twice, once with their selected SV and once with a value that they reported feeling neutral
towards (i.e., a “not sacred value” or NSV). The “Not Sacred Values Scale” (NSVS) was
conceived as a theoretical complement to the SVS to contrast the degree to which participants
sacralize a value that they have self-identified to be important against one which they do not
consider important. It was expected that the SVS would not or negatively associate with the
NSVS and the NSVS would not associate with the measures of attitude strength or moral
conviction.
The outcome variables for this study included resistance to taboo tradeoffs and
willingness to aggress for one’s SV. To measure resistance to taboo tradeoffs, participants were
asked to consider a hypothetical scenario (inspired by Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007)
wherein they revealed their SV during a conversation over dinner with a gender-neutral person
(“Sam”) who would provoke an argument by calling the participants’ SV “stupid.” Participants
were asked the degree to which they would be satisfied with 3 possible resolutions from this
interaction: a taboo resolution where Sam pays for your expensive meal in exchange for the
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participant to “stop arguing;” a successful resolution where Sam conceded to losing the argument
and has a change of heart about the participants’ SV; and a symbolic resolution wherein Sam
politely apologizes for provoking an argument but made no concession of defeat.

It was

predicted that the SVS would be negatively associated with satisfaction for the taboo resolution,
while the NSVS would be positively associated with the taboo resolution. Furthermore, it was
predicted that the SVS should be positively associated with the successful and symbolic
resolutions, while the NSVS should show no relationship with the successful and symbolic
resolutions.
To measure willingness to aggress, 4 items were taken from previous research that
assessed the likelihood that Palestinians and Israeli participants would support terrorist activity
(Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009). These items were adapted for an American sample and
used to assess the likelihood that participants would endorse: getting into a verbal argument,
physically fighting, and dying over their SV as well as the degree to which participants attribute
problems to people who do not respect their SV. Each item on this scale was treated as an
individual outcome, as they were in the original article. It was hypothesized that the SVS would
positively predict willingness to aggress over an SV, and that the SVS would out-predict attitude
strength and moral conviction. Likewise, no association was expected between the NSVS and
willingness to aggress over an SV.

METHODS

Power analysis.
A power analysis using G*Power (version 3.1) using a minimally interesting effect size
of 0.05 (taken from Neria, Ochoa, Pando, 2014), testing a total of 3 predictor variables indicated
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that 222 participants were necessary to reach a desired power of .80 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, &
Lang, 2009).

Participants.
A total of 234 participants were collected for the present study (104 men, 127 women,
_

= 39.70), of these 3 were omitted for failing any of 2 attention probe items, yielding a

final sample of 231 participants. Participants were recruited from across The United States via
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were compensated $1.00 for completing the study.
Participants consisted of 80.30% European heritage, 5.10% African heritage, 5.10% Latin
heritage, 4.70% Asian heritage, and 1.30% Native American, and 3.50% other.

Measures.

The SVS.
Participants were exposed to the final SVS that was developed in Study 1. Similar to
Study 1, participants were first met with a title screen, which would explain that they were going
to be asked questions about “things people value.” After this, participants were given the option
to choose from the following list of American SV: Loyalty, Freedom, The environment, Being
pro-choice, Being pro-life, Equality, Liberalism, Conservatism, Libertarianism, education,
Freedom of Speech, Evolution, My religion, My faith, My spirituality, Animal Welfare,
Democracy, Communism, Socialism, or an “other” option. Participants who felt their SV was not
represented were directed to indicate the “other” option, after which participants were able to
type in their own SV in a free-response text field. All self-identified SV were then used in place
of the placeholder.
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The NSVS.
Participants were exposed to the same SVS items, but rather than have the placeholder
replaced with the participants’ self-identified SV. The NSV-35 replaced the placeholder with a
value the participants’ reported feeling neutral towards. Participants were met with another title
screen telling them that the study was interested in asking the same questions “slightly
differently to see if this effects your answers.” After this, participants were asked to rank the
same set of American SV (without the “other” option) according to the values they most loved
and hated. After this, the participants answered the SVS items with the target SV replaced with a
value that the participants reported feeling neutral towards.

The attitude strength measure.
To assess attitude strength, a 5-item ( = .73) questionnaire asking how strongly
participants feel about their SV, how important it is to them personally, and how much it is
related to how they see themselves as a person (Lavine, Huff, Wagner, & Sweeney, 1998). The
items were measured on a 7-point scale where higher scores endorse greater attitude strength, see
Appendix A for the full attitude strength measure.

The moral conviction measure.
To assess the extent to which a persons’ SV is associated with their moral stance on what
is right and wrong, a 4-item moral conviction scale ( = .92) was used (Skitka Bauman, &
Sargis, 2005). The items were measured on a 5-point scale where higher scores endorse greater
moral conviction, see Appendix B for the full moral conviction measure.
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Taboo tradeoffs scenario.
To measure resistance to taboo tradeoffs participants were asked to consider a
hypothetical scenario (inspired by Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007) wherein the
participants reveal their SV during a conversation over dinner with a gender-neutral person
(“Sam”) who would provoke an argument by calling the participants’ SV “stupid.” Participants
were asked the degree to which they would be satisfied (1=not at all satisfied to 7=very satisfied)
with 3 possible resolutions from this interaction: a taboo resolution where Sam pays for the
participants’ expensive meal in exchange for the participant to “stop arguing;” a symbolic
resolution wherein Sam politely apologizes for provoking an argument but made no concession
of defeat; and a successful resolution where Sam conceded to losing the argument and has a
change of heart about the participants’ SV. See Appendix C for the full taboo tradeoffs scenario.

Willingness to aggress.
Items were taken from previous research that assessed the likelihood that Palestinians and
Israelis would support terrorist activity (Ginges, Hansen, Norenzayan, 2009). These items were
adapted for an American sample and used to assess, in 4 items, the likelihood that participants
would support getting into an argument, physically fighting, and dying over a SV as well as the
degree to which participants attribute problems to people who do not respect their SV. See
Appendix D for the willingness to aggress measures.

Procedure.
Participants were recruited via MTurk and then directed to the Qualtrics survey platform.
Participants were exposed to the SVS, a Not Sacred Values Scale, followed by an Attitude
Strength scale ( = .73; Lavine, Huff, Wagner, & Sweeney, 1998), a Moral Conviction scale
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( = .92; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). This was followed by measures of resistance to
taboo tradeoffs, and a willingness to aggress scale (adapted from Ginges, Hansen, &
Norenzayan, 2009) before concluding with a demographics questionnaire. All items for all
scales were presented randomly.

Predictions.
By proceeding to specify the SVS in a more psychometrically appropriate manner, it is
expected that the SVS should exhibit a much stronger internal consistency overall and within the
factors. In confirming the SVS, it is predicted that the new SVS should converge with measures
of attitude strength and moral conviction, and the SVS should diverge from the NSVS. It is
expected that the SVS, attitude strength, and moral conviction should correlate with each other
and with willingness to aggress, but the SVS should uniquely predict willingness to aggress and
resistance to taboo tradeoffs. The NSVS should correlate negatively or not at all with the SVS,
attitude strength, and moral conviction. Moreover, it is expected that the SVS should positively
predict willingness to aggress over their SV. Furthermore it is predicted that the SVS, not the
NSVS, should be positively associated with problem-attribution. Additionally, it is predicted
that the SVS should be negatively associated with satisfaction for the taboo resolution in the
taboo tradeoffs scenario while the NSVS should be positively associated with the taboo
resolution. It is predicted that the SVS should be positively associated with the successful and
symbolic resolutions, while the NSVS should show no relationship with the successful or
symbolic resolutions.
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RESULTS

Internal consistency.
Table 5 shows the reliability estimates for the SVS the overall reliability was high, as
were the reliability estimates for each of the subscales (all Cronbach’s s ≥ .80 and all
McDonald’s s > .80).

Factor analysis.

Overview of model fit indices.
The fit indices used to evaluate the SVS are the absolute indices such as the Chi-squared
statistic (

).

Absolute fit indices evaluate the difference between observed variance and

covariances against model-implied variances and covariances; increasing the number of
parameters in the model will decrease the deviation between observed and model-implied
covariances and variances (Kline, 2011; McDonald, 1999). A significant

statistic (i.e.,

>

.05) is indicative of acceptable model fit (Kline, 2011; McDonald, 1999). Parsimonious model
fit indices evaluate discrepancy between sample covariance matrix and estimated covariance
matrix while taking model complexity into account (McDonald, 1999); these indices improve
when parameters that contribute to model are added.

The root mean square error of

approximation (RMSEA) is a parsimonious fit index that will be used in this study. When
interpreting RMSEA, a value below .05 is considered excellent, values between .05 and .08 are
good, values between .08 and .10 are acceptable, and values greater than .10 are considered poor
representation of the data (Steiger & Lind, 1980; Browne & Cudeck, 1993).

Finally,

Comparative model fit indices compares a model’s absolute fit or parsimonious fit to that of a
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baseline model, typically the null model or the independence model (Kline, 2011; McDonald,
1999). The comparative fit indices used in this study are the comparative fit index (CFI) and the
Tucker Lewis index (TLI) otherwise known as the non-normed fit index (NNFI). For both CFI
and TLI values greater than .90 are acceptable representations of the data while values greater
than .95 are good to excellent representations of the data (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980; Kline 2011).

Model fit of the SVS.
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted in Mplus (version 7.02; Muthén, &
Muthén, 1998-2012) using a weighted least squares with mean and variance adjusted (WLSMV)
estimator to confirm the factor structure of the SVS and to assess the item loadings onto their
component factors and the factor loadings onto the higher order SV factor. The resulting model
displayed good fit. The
(

= 1381.18,

statistic was significant, which is indicative of poor model fit

< .01). The CFI and TLI for the SVS are both above .90 but below .95,

which is an indication of acceptable model fit (#$% = 0.91; &'% = 0.91). Furthermore, the
RMSEA is approximately .08 (90% #% = .07, .09), which indicates good to acceptable fit. At
best, the SVS can be said to have “good” model fit, which justifies continued data-analysis but
suggests that further re-specification of the SVS may be required to improve model fit.

Factor analytic results.
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted in Mplus (version 7.02; Muthén, &
Muthén, 1998-2012) using a weighted least squares with mean and variance adjusted (WLSMV)
estimator to confirm the factor structure of the SVS and to assess the item loadings onto their
component factors and the factor loadings onto the higher order SV factor. Table 4 shows the
final set of SVS items as well as the item and factor loadings. All items loaded significantly to
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their factors, however, item 10 (“You should choose your words carefully when you talk about
SV”) loaded weakly on MA ( = .38). No other items seemed to load poorly on the CFA. All
factor loadings performed as expected and loaded strongly onto the higher-order SV factor.

SVS factor correlations.
As can be seen in Table 6, all the factors of the SVS correlate significantly, even after a
Bonferroni multiplicity correction.

The correlation between MA and ME was noticeably

stronger than that between any other factors (* = .74,
included MS and MI (* = .65,

> .01); other notably strong correlations

> .01), as well as RC and MS (* = .60,

> .01). That MA

and ME are so strongly correlated is interesting considering that they are both represent a
repulsion by thoughts, actions, or people that are contrary to one’s SV. The weakest correlations
existed between MS and ME (* = .33,
well as MA and RC (* = .42,

> .01), followed by MI and ME (* = .40,

> .01), as

> .01). These weaker correlations are theoretically consistent

considering that they represent the relationship between generally pro-social factors (MS, and
MI) with anti-social factors (namely, ME). All factors correlated strongly with the higher-order
SV factor (all *s ≥ .76).

Convergent & discriminate validity.
Table 6 also shows the zero-order correlation coefficients for SVS with attitude strength,
moral conviction, the NSVS, and all other outcome measures (to be discussed). It was predicted
that the SVS should correlate positively with both attitude strength and moral conviction when
SV is the target. Moreover, it was predicted that the NSVS should not correlate with the SVS,
attitude strength, or moral conviction. As can be seen in Table 6, the SVS was positively
correlated with both attitude strength (* = .34,
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< .01) and moral conviction (* = .37,

<

.01), demonstrating convergent validity. Furthermore, the SVS negatively correlated with the
NSVS (* = −.15,

< .01), demonstrating discriminant validity.

Predictive validity.

Correlations.
Table 6 shows all correlations between the SVS, its factors, AS, MC, NSVS, and all of
the outcome measures, significant correlations are flagged at the

= .05 and

= .01 levels.

Further, correlations that remain significant after a Bonferroni multiplicity correction are
distinguished.

It was predicted that the SVS should negatively correlate with the taboo

resolution in the taboo tradeoffs scenario and positively correlate with the symbolic and
successful resolutions. Moreover, it was predicted that the SVS should positively correlate with
support for arguing, fighting, and dying for an SV as well as a problem attribution. It was
expected that the NSVS would significantly correlate with the taboo resolution, but the NSV-35
was uncorrelated with any outcomes; therefore, the NSVS be reported on in further analyses.

Taboo tradeoffs scenario.
As Table 6 shows, the SVS was negatively correlated with the taboo resolution (* =
−.22) and positively correlated with the symbolic (* = .21) and successful resolution (* = .17),
as predicted. Moreover, attitude strength for SV was only correlated with the taboo resolution
(* = −.17), while moral conviction for the SV only correlated with the symbolic (* = .19) and
the successful resolutions (* = .15). Interestingly, the factors of the SVS revealed a differential
pattern of associations with the taboo tradeoffs scenario whereby some factors were not
significantly associated while others were. For example, all factors were negatively correlated
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with the taboo resolution, but only MS remained significant after the Bonferroni correction (* =
−.21,

< .01). Moreover, MA was the only factor not correlated with the symbolic resolution

and only RC remained significantly correlated after the Bonferroni correction (* = .27,

< .01).

Finally, both MA and ME were uncorrelated with the successful resolution and only MI
remained correlated after the Bonferroni correction (* = .21,

< .01).

Willingness to aggress.
The SVS was also positively correlated with willingness to argue (* = .34), and fight
(* = .16) for a SV as well as attribute the world’s problems to people who don’t appreciate SV
(* = .43), as predicted. Contrary to what was predicted, however, The SVS was not correlated
with willingness to die for one’s SV.

Both attitude strength and moral conviction were

correlated with willingness to argue (* = .21; * = .26, respectively) and, surprisingly, with
willingness to die for a SV (* = .26 and * = .14, respectively). Moral conviction was also
correlated with problem attribution (* = .29), and neither attitude strength nor moral conviction
correlated with willingness to fight for one’s SV. As was the case for the taboo tradeoffs
scenario, the factors of the SVS exhibited differential associations with willingness to aggress.
All 5 factors remained positively correlated with willingness to argue after the Bonferroni
correction was applied, but these correlations were not particularly large (largest * = .36,
.01). Moreover, willingness to fight was only correlated with MA (* = .29,
(* = .33,

<

< .01) and ME

< .01), and both remained significant after the Bonferroni correction.

Most

interestingly, whereas the SVS was not correlated with willingness to die, RC actually exhibited
a correlation with willingness to die (* = .23,
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< .01); no other factors were correlated with

willingness to die. Finally, all 5 factors correlated with problem attribution and all but RC
remained significant after the Bonferroni correction was applied.

Path analyses.
To further assess the predictive utility of the SVS over attitude strength and moral
conviction, 3 separate path analyses were conducted on taboo tradeoffs and willingness to
aggress. First, a path model regressing the outcome variables onto only attitude strength and
moral conviction was specified, followed by a path model regressing the outcome variables onto
SVS.

Finally, because the factors of the SVS exhibited differential correlations, a third

exploratory path model was specified that regressed the outcome variables onto the 5 SVS
factors. The exploratory model was specified primarily in order to better understand whether the
SVS would function better as a composite measure of SV compared to its factors.

Taboo tradeoffs.
It was predicted that attitude strength and moral conviction should negatively predict
satisfaction with the taboo resolution, have no relationship with the symbolic resolution, and
positively predict satisfaction with the successful resolution. Further, it was hypothesized that
the SVS should negatively predict satisfaction with the taboo resolution, and positively predict
satisfaction with the symbolic and successful resolution. It was also predicted that the SVS
should out-predict attitude strength and moral conviction by accounting for a greater amount of
variance when included in the model, compared to when it is withheld.
coefficients reported are standardized.
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All regression

Figure 1 shows the results of a path diagram regressing the taboo, symbolic, and
successful resolutions on attitude strength and moral conviction. The first model had 54 degrees
of freedom, and demonstrated acceptable to good model fit (-%# = 9728.83; .%# = 9900.73;
= 113.50,

< .01; / 01- = .07, 90%#% = .05, .09; #$% = .92; &'% = .89; 0/ / =

.05). Attitude strength significantly predicted resistance to the taboo resolution (2 = −0.19,
01 = 0.07,

= .01) and satisfaction with the symbolic resolution (2 = 0.18, 01 = 0.08,

=

.03). Attitude strength did not predict satisfaction with the successful resolution, and moral
conviction did not predict any of the taboo tradeoffs outcomes.
Figure 2 shows the results of a path diagram regressing the taboo, symbolic, and
successful resolutions on attitude strength, moral conviction, and SVS. This model had 1055
degrees of freedom, and demonstrated merely acceptable model fit (-%# = 27863.69; .%# =
28444.72;

= 1914.21,

< .01; / 01- = .06, 90%#% = .05, .06; #$% = .82; &'% = .81;

0/ / = .08). In this model, the taboo resolution was not associated with the SVS ( = .31),
attitude strength ( = .19), nor moral conviction ( = .98). Satisfaction with the symbolic
resolution was only predicted by the SVS (2 = 0.27, 01 = 0.11,

= .02).

And finally,

satisfaction with the successful resolution was also only predicted by the SVS (2 = 0.23, 01 =
0.11,

= .03).
Figure 3 shows the results of a path diagram regressing the taboo, symbolic, and

successful resolutions on attitude strength, moral conviction, and the 5 factors of the SVS. This
model had 1039 degrees of freedom, and demonstrated merely acceptable model fit (-%# =
27875.58; .%# = 28511.62;

= 1890.73,

< .01; / 01- = .06, 90%#% = .05, .06;

#$% = .82; &'% = .81; 0/ / = .08). In this model, resistance to the taboo resolution was only
predicted by ME (2 = −0.70, 01 = 0.33,

= .03). Satisfaction with the symbolic resolution
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was only predicted by RC (2 = 0.36, 01 = 0.11,

= .04). And finally, satisfaction with the

successful resolution was not associated with any of the predictors.

Willingness to aggress.
It was predicted that the attitude strength, moral conviction, and the SVS should
positively predict participants’ self-reported willingness to argue, fight, and die for their SV as
well as for participants to attribute the world’ problems to people who do not appreciate their SV
(collectively: “willingness to aggress”). However it was further hypothesized that the SVS
should out-predict willingness to aggress by accounting for a greater amount of variance when
included in the model, compared to when it is withheld.
Figure 4 shows the results of a path diagram regressing willingness to argue, fight, die,
and problem attribution on attitude strength and moral conviction. This model had 54 degrees of
freedom, and demonstrated acceptable to good model fit (-%# = 7533.51; .%# = 7703.87;
= 112.61,

< .01; / 01- = .07, 90%#% = .05, .09; #$% = .93; &'% = .90; 0/ / =

.05). Willingness to argue was predicted by both attitude strength (2 = 0.27, 01 = 0.07,
.01) and moral conviction (2 = 0.18, 01 = 0.09,

= .05). Willingness to fight was only

predicted by attitude strength (2 = 0.15, 01 = 0.07,
0.30, 01 = 0.08,

< .01).

<

= .03), as was willingness to die (2 =

Problem attribution, however, was only predicted by moral

conviction (2 = 0.26, 01 = 0.08,

< .01).

Figure 5 shows the results of a path diagram regressing willingness to argue, fight, die,
and problem attribution on attitude strength, moral conviction, and the SVS. This model had
1055 degrees of freedom, and demonstrated unacceptable to acceptable model fit (-%# =
23493.42; .%# = 24059.08;

= 2066.50,
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< .01; / 01- = .07, 90%#% = .06, .07;

#$% = .79; &'% = .78; 0/ / = .10). In this model, willingness to argue was predicted only by
attitude strength (2 = 0.22, 01 = 0.10,
0.09,

= .02), as was willingness to fight (2 = 0.18, 01 =

= .04). Willingness to die was predicted by the SVS, though in the opposite direction of

what was predicted (2 = −0.22, 01 = 0.10,

= .04); willingness to die was also predicted by

attitude strength, and in the appropriate direction (2 = 0.40, 01 = 0.10,
problem attribution was predicted by the SVS (2 = 0.42, 01 = 0.10,
conviction (2 = 0.18, 01 = 0.08,

< .01). Finally,
< .01) and moral

= .03).

Figure 6 shows the results of a path diagram regressing willingness to argue, fight, die,
and problem attribution on attitude strength, moral conviction, and the 5 factors of the SVS.
This model had 1039 degrees of freedom, and demonstrated unacceptable to acceptable model fit
(-%# = 23411.02; .%# = 24030.24;

= 1964.97,

< .01; / 01- = .07, 90%#% =

.06, .07; #$% = .81; &'% = .80; 0/ / = .09). In this model, none of the predictors were
associated with willingness to argue. Willingness to fight was predicted by MI, though in the
opposite direction of what was predicted (2 = −.25, 01 = 0.10,

= .02).

Interestingly,

willingness to die was positively predicted by RC (2 = 0.30, 01 = 0.13,

= .02) and

negatively by (2 = −0.47, 01 = 0.10,
die (2 = 0.26, 01 = 0.12,
(2 = 0.53, 01 = 0.09,

< .01); attitude strength also predicted willingness to

= .02). Finally, problem attribution was only predicted by MI

< .01).

DISCUSSION
The results of a multivariate analysis of the predictive utility of the SVS yielded
somewhat unexpected results. When examined alone, attitude strength is the sole predictor of
dissatisfaction with the taboo and symbolic resolution.
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Moral conviction does not predict

satisfaction with any of the resolutions to the taboo tradeoffs scenario when attitude strength is
included in the model.

Investigating the model that predicts satisfaction with the taboo,

symbolic, and successful resolutions with attitude strength, moral conviction, and the SVS
showed that the SVS only predicted satisfaction with the symbolic and successful resolutions,
and when the SVS was included in the model attitude strength dropped as a predictor. This only
partially supported the hypotheses, as it was expected that the SVS would negatively predict
satisfaction with the taboo resolution.
However a potential explanation for this effect may be provided by the exploratory model
that investigated the SVS’s predictive utility at the factor-level revealed. This model revealed an
interesting pattern of associations such that both MC and ME were negative predictors of
satisfaction with the taboo resolution. Further, RC was the lone positive predictor of satisfaction
with the symbolic resolution, and none of the factors predicted satisfaction with the successful
resolution. This demonstrates a differential pattern of predictions that can be made when the
higher-order SV factor is used compared to its factors, as the general factor did not associate
with the taboo resolution but did associate with the successful resolution.
When looking at the predictive utility of attitude strength and moral conviction in a
multivariate framework, attitude strength was able to predict willingness to argue, fight, and die
for a SV while moral conviction also predicted willingness to argue and uniquely predicted
problem attribution. Including the SVS into the model did not change the associations that
attitude strength had on willingness to argue, fight, or die; moral conviction, however, did drop
as a predictor of willingness to argue when the SVS was included in the model. Furthermore, the
SVS did perform as was hypothesized. The SVS predicted problem attribution and exhibited a
surprising negative association with willingness to die for SV, but did not predict willingness to
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argue or fight when attitude strength and moral conviction were included in the model. An
exploratory analysis investigating the SVS’s predictive utility at the factor-level may have
revealed an explanation for these findings, however.
While none of the factors remained significant predictors of willingness to argue, MI
revealed negative associations with willingness to fight and die for SV.

Inasmuch as MI

represents the participants desire to encourage teaching and learning about SV, it seems to make
sense that this factor would be negatively associated with fighting and dying insofar as those
outcomes exist counter to the goal of proselytizing SV. Moreover, RC did positively predict
willingness to die for SV which suggests that the more a person idealizes their SV the more
likely they are to consider the extreme action of dying for it. Finally, MI was also a positive
predictor of problem attribution; it makes theoretical sense that a desire to teach SV would be
positively associated with a tendency to attribute the world’s problems to people who do not
have a sufficient understanding of SV. When analyzed along with attitude strength and moral
conviction, neither MA, MS, nor ME were significant predictors of willingness to aggress.
Taken together, the results of the confirmatory sample suggest that the SVS is a internally
consistent measure of SV, but one that demonstrates a differential and sometimes contradictory
pattern of association with the variables it was intended to predict.
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General Discussion
A re-specification of the SVS was appropriate to address methodological concerns that
were present during the conception of the 15-item version. These methodological issues yielded
a scale that, although internally consistent overall, did not have internally reliable subscales. The
SVS was specified first by removing items that did not load onto a single common factor; this
step alone removed several items that made it into the original 15-item measure. Moreover, the
SVS was developed in an iterative process that kept consistent with the SVPM, as such the factor
structure reflected the theoretical factors structure proposed by the SVPM (Tetlock, 2003). After
drawing a confirmatory sample, the SVS demonstrated that it was an internally consistent scale,
but its predictive utility requires further investigation.

THE SVS AND THE SVPM
The SVPM suggests that SV are indicated by 3 factors, however, the SVS revealed a 5factor solution that partialed pro- and anti-social components out of the moral outrage and moral
cleansing factors. As such the moral outrage factor has been divided into moral aversion, which
represents a repulsion from people and actions that contradict one’s SV, and moral support,
which represents an attraction towards people and actions that reinforce one’s SV. Similarly,
moral cleansing has been divided into moral induction, which represents support for teaching
and learning about one’s SV, and moral exclusion, which represents a preference towards being
around people who think similarly about one’s SV. Group cohesion, or pro-sociality, was
consistently mentioned, but was considered ancillary point, to the SVPM (see Fiske, & Tetlock,
1997; Tetlock, 2002; 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). In contrast, groupcohesion is crucial to the concept of devoted actors (Atran, Sheikh, & Gomez, 2014a; 2014b;
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Atran, & Ginges, 2015). A person can be considered a devoted actor when that person begins to
endorse extreme adherence to an SV. When a person transitions into a devoted actor research
suggests that their identities fuse with other devoted actors and they will endorse costly sacrifices
for the sake of their SV as well as for the sake of other devoted actors, as their in-group (Atran,
Sheikh, & Gómez, 2014a; 2014b). In light the research on devoted actors, and considering the
results of the present study, it seems reasonable that a group-cohesiveness component may be
necessarily indicated of SV. However, further research is needed to investigate the role of
identity fusion—and perhaps even identity itself—on SV and the transition between an adherent
and a devoted actor.

LIMITATIONS & FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Addressing model fit.
The SVS did not demonstrated only good to acceptable model fit. This is not surprising
however, as the unique nature of the SVS involves a yet unaccounted for source of variance that
results from the fact that participants are free to select any possible SV from the universe of SV.
Future directions would largely focus on further re-specifying the SVS as a random effects
model. Previously, the SVS was analyzed as a fixed-effects model. However, this assumption
fails for two reasons: first, theoretically, because a person’s SV can be virtually anything it is
impossible to know how many SV exist in the universe at any given time. And second, because
participants in Studies 1 and 2 were given the option to type in anything they wished as their SV
it is impossible to know if we have taken a representative sample of the universe of SV. Because
the levels for SV cannot be theoretically known, and because the SVS was not validated in such
a way as the levels for SV were constrained (Keppel, & Wickens, 2004), analyzing the SVS as a
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random effects model would be appropriate.

Accounting for random effects may be a

theoretically appropriate next step that would certainly improve model fit (see Maydeu-Olivares,
& Coffman, 2006). Additionally, the results of the CFA revealed two items from moral aversion
loaded weakly to their factors, weakly loading items may negatively impact model fit. Further
research is needed to assess whether this weak loading are aberrations or whether those items
will need to be adapted or dropped in the future.

Predictive validity.
The differential pattern of associations when the general SV factor was used compared to
when its 5 factors were used suggest that the SV construct may not be a particularly useful
predictor unless the factors are considered separately. Most troublesome were the opposing
associations that was observed between RC and MI with willingness to die for one’s SV.
Opposing effects of the factors may explain the general factor’s inconsistent associations.
However, the opposing associations of the factors of SV might not be particularly surprising.
The SVPM, from which the items for the SVS theoretically derived, describes holding a SV as
engaging in a cognitive battle, of sorts, between defending and supporting one’s SV. Much of
the SVPM suggest that there is great potential for psychological reactance when a person’s SV is
seen as threatened as the individual is caught between their desires to protect their SV and their
desires to act as the best possible representatives of their SV.
When considered in relation to the present experiment, it may be the case that under
certain circumstances the individual factors that indicate the higher-order SV factor may
disparately associate with situational outcomes in such a way as it reflects the cognitive battle
that the SVPM theorizes (e.g., Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000).
Consider the case of willingness to die for one’s SV. When that SV is threatened, the present
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data suggest that the RC factor will encourage the individual to martyr themselves to protect
their SV, while the MI factor seems to motivate a person to remain alive in the interests of
further promulgating their SV. If this differential pattern of associations persists, it may be
worthwhile for future research to investigate the specific circumstances or personality
characteristics that may contribute to a person deciding to engage in more extreme behaviors to
protect their SV.
Moreover, the observation that attitude strength was uniquely predictive of willingness to
die for a SV was unexpected, but interesting. As of now it has not been clear where the
demarcation exists between when and under what circumstances a person who holds a SV will
be willing to die for it. However, there has been research suggesting that there may be distinct
set of individual difference variables that influence this transition. The devoted actors construct,
for example, exists as an alternative to the rational actor model.

The rational actor, to

recapitulate, is a utility maximizer, who makes decisions by objectively weighing several
alternatives with the intention of making a decision that maximizes fungible or practical benefits,
and minimizes costs or risk.
However, the devoted actor does not make decisions based upon fungible concerns, nor is
the devoted actor concerned with personal gain; rather, the devoted actor makes decisions based
upon what is maximally beneficial for their SV (see Atran, & Ginges, 2015; Atran, Sheikh, &
Gómez, 2014a; 2014b). As was demonstrated empirically by the remarkably low effect sizes in
Study 2, merely measuring a person’s SV does not account for much of the variance in their
decision-making. Indeed, there are likely other individual difference variables that will need to
be identified to more accurately model decision-making where SV are central, and the devoted
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actors construct may provide insight into the decision making processes that lead to the most
extreme outcomes that the SVS was not able to model: namely, dying for one’s SV.

Devoted actors and identity fusion.
The devoted actors construct has been used to reliably predict behaviors such as
willingness to sacrifice for one’s SV as well as for other devoted actors. One of the definitive
components to the devoted actors constructs is the idea of identity fusion or the tendency for
people to consider themselves as practically indistinguishable from their group.

In the

framework of SV, identity fusion may occur when adherence to a SV becomes such that their
individual identity becomes undifferentiated from their status as an adherent of a particular SV.
This conception is discussed in early theoretical accounts of SV (e.g., Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock,
Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) and has been empirically demonstrated (see Atran, &
GInges, 2015; Atran, Sheikh, & Gómez, 2014a; 2014b).
It seems reasonable to expect that those people who can be called “devoted actors” have
fused their personal identities with that of their SV. However, it remains unclear to what degree
identity fusion exists among those people who have one or more SV but who do not endorse or
exhibit the extreme commitment that is indicative of a “devoted actor.” It therefore remains
unclear to what degree identity fusion is a function of SV per se or if identity fusion is a unique
indicator of “devoted actors.” Future research may investigate this using the established SVS
under a Latent Transition Analysis (LTA) framework using the same measures of identity fusion
used by Atran and colleagues to assess identity fusion (Atran, & Ginges, 2015; Atran, Sheikh, &
Gómez, 2014a; 2014b).
The role of identity as it related to SV, especially under a devoted actors framework,
should be considered as a potential moderating variable that enables decision-makers to consider
47

sacrificing themselves or others for the good of their SV. If we understand devoted actors to be a
subset of SV adherents then it may be possible to use the SVS to measure what influences a
person’s transition from a mere adherent of a SV to a devoted actor. Using an incendiary
outcome such as willingness to die, or perhaps more appropriately: identity fusion, it may be
possible to identify using LTA when, and under what circumstances, an individual becomes a
devoted actor.

Devoted actors and group cohesion.
Earlier it was discussed that the SV construct may lead to opposing associations in certain
contexts. The observation that RC and MI exhibited opposite associations with willingness to
die was considered. But consider also the disparity between the MS and ME factors of the SVS.
These two factors were partialed respectively from the moral outrage and cleansing components
of the SVPM and theoretically may indicate pro- and anti-social aspects of SV. Consider MS,
which encourages people and behaviors that are emblematic of one’s SV, and ME, which
motivates alienating one’s self from people and thoughts that are contrary to one’s SV. Under
what circumstances might these aspects of SV work against each other? Previous research has
identified that devoted actors are those people who irrationally protect their SV and who tend to
fuse their personal identities with that of other devoted actors (Atran, & Ginges, 2015). Atran,
Sheikh, and Gómez (2014a; 2014b) have found that devoted actors tend to endorse willingness to
fight and die for their SV as well as for other devoted actors. But this research tends to analyze
the behaviors and motivations of devoted actors when they perceive some external threat to their
SV.
Other research exists that demonstrates that idealistic groups tend to be most cohesive
when they perceive themselves as threatened (Perliger, & Pedahzur, 2014), but the SVPM asserts
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that threats to a SV may be external or internal (Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, &
Lerner, 2000). The MS and ME components suggest that when a threat is external MS should
motivate devoted actors towards lionizing other devoted actors and ME should motivate devoted
actors to dissociate with people who represent that external threat. But what might the devoted
actor’s motivations be in situations where there exists no external threat to SV? ME suggests
that devoted actors may still be motivated to alienate people who are perceived as violating their
SV, while MI suggests that devoted actors will continue to probe each other for correct thinking
about their SV.
Previous research on value-based intragroup conflict suggests that conflict increases
when group-members perceive their values to be less similar (Jehn, 1994; see also Kouzakova,
Ellemers, Harinck, & Scheepers, 2012). Framed in the context of SV, previous research suggests
that it may be possible that, when devoted actors perceive no external threat, MS and MI might
encourage group-cohesion of devoted actors insofar as the devoted actors continue to perceive
their SV as being similar, or conceptually pure. However, when this similarity is no longer
perceived, or when conceptual purity is tainted, MA and ME will work to deteriorate this groupcohesion, possibly forming splinter groups. Future research may be fruitful in investigating the
potential for conditional group-cohesion of groups of people that are centered on a SV.

Attitude strength and sacred values.
Attitudes research is often mentioned in conjunction with SV research (e.g., Ginges, &
Atran, 2014; Ryan, 2014; Verhallen, & van Raaij, 1986), however only inasmuch as to
demonstrate that SV is distinct from attitude strength (e.g, Hanselmann, & Tanner, 2008).
Heretofore, attitude strength has been utilized solely to provide convergent and discriminant
validity of the SVS. Attitude strength was considered a variable that is related enough to SV as
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to correlate, but distinct enough such that attitude strength would not predict willingness to
aggress nor taboo tradeoffs when the SVS is included. However, considering that willingness to
die for one’s SV was uniquely predicted by attitude strength, rather than the SVS, perhaps a reconception of the role of attitude strength on SV is in order.

A tendency to sacralize.
Another potential individual difference variable to consider is a tendency for people to
sacralize values. That is to say, it may be the case that individuals might vary on the frequency
by which they consider a value so important to them as to have made it sacred. Indeed, it seems
possible that there may exist variation such that some people could hold multiple SV while
others hold only 1. Previous research has already demonstrated that above average religious
service attendance has the potential to consider personal preferences (e.g., preferring a brand of
computer and then making that brand sacred) sacred (Sheikh, Ginges, Coman, & Atran, 2012).
However, when considered with research demonstrating the effects of above average religious
participation is moderated by interpersonal submissiveness (Saraglou, Corneille, & Van
Cappellen, 2009; Van Capellen, Corneille, Cols, & Saroglou, 2011), it may just be the case that
highly submissive people have a greater tendency to sacralize values—especially if they
experience some social pressure to consider such a value sacred.
In the future a Tendency to Sacralize Scale may be appropriate to measure the likelihood
that a person might be somehow predisposed to consider values sacred. Such a measure might
also serve as a proxy indicator of the extremity by which a person holds a particular SV, as a
person with a higher tendency to sacralize values might not hold that value as dearly as someone
with a SV who is not predisposed to sacralize values. Moreover, it seems likely that a person
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with a tendency to hold several values sacred might not be as motivated to act to protect 1 of
their many SV against a perceived slight as someone who has only 1 SV.

Transient sacred values.
Likewise, it seems reasonable to assume that if people may vary on the amount of values
they consider sacred, people may also vary on how long they hold these values sacred. Indeed, a
person seems much more likely to act on their SV if it has demonstrated some longevity as
compared to a person who jumps from SV to SV. Longitudinal studies on SV may provide
insight into the cluster of individual difference variables that make a SV enduring. Additionally,
such a study may also provide insight into the amount of time that a person needs to hold an SV
before that person will act upon it. Such studies may provide crucial understanding into the
variables that influence extreme decisions such as dying or killing in the name of an SV.

The semantic problem.
Another potentially major limitations of the SVS included problems with the semantics of
the items themselves. The sematic problem was most notable with abstract ideals such as loyalty
or freedom, values such as these read awkwardly when plugged into the SVS (e.g., “People who
are experts in loyalty are good role models”). The present incarnation of the SVS seems to work
best a SV that is a collective noun (but not a count noun) expressing the name of a group,
practice, discipline, or ideal.

Such nouns may be indicated by the suffixes –ism (e.g.,

environmentalism, behaviorism), or –ology (e.g., psychology, phrenology), and may also include
the names of: religious groups (e.g., Islam, Christian Science), political parties (e.g., Psychology,
The Democratic Party), or other singular names of groups at large—but not group-members
(e.g., psychologists, democrats).
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One possible solution to this semantic problem would be to develop a body of SV scales
specifically to measure particular categories of SV. Another potential solution would be to
generate more items with greater concern for making sure that the items will make grammatical
sense regardless of the SV that is selected. A third solution to this, which seems most appealing,
would be to perhaps publish a companion guide for adapting the presently developed items to
accommodate different types of SV. The lattermost solution would still require further research
to establish taxa of SV, however.
The possibility that there may be certain types, or classes of sacred values seems very
high. For example, participants who identify as their SV concepts like liberalism, conservatism,
or libertarianism may respond similarly to each other by virtue of all those values being
American political parties or orientations. However, those participants might not be expected to
respond similarly to those who espouse concepts such as performance orientation, uncertainty
avoidance, and assertiveness, which are representative of Germanic cultural values (Gupta,
Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). That is to say, it may be reasonable to expect that certain SVs
would cluster together according to some shared pattern of responses.
To address this, future research may perform a latent class analysis to investigate whether
there tends to be a predictable pattern of participant responses to the SVS as a function of the
type of SV that they chose (see Vermunt, & Magidson, 2004).

Additionally, it may be

worthwhile to investigate the participants’ chosen SV as a grouping variable.

Dividing

participants according to the SV they espoused may provide insight into sources of variance that
have yet to be accounted. Configural, metric, residual, and latent construct invariance may be
investigated as a function of the SV that a group of participants espoused (see Cheung, &
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Rensvold, 2002). Thus it may be possible to discern where people vary on the SVS if we group
them according the SV that they selected.

The issue of culture.
Another potential limitation worth mentioning is the issue of culture and the effect that
different cultures may have on the interpretation of the SVS. As it exists now, the SVS has only
been exposed to participants from The United States. However, the intended application of the
SVS has far-reaching implications that span the globe. The process of adapting a psychometric
measure to another culture is long and arduous (see Beaton, Bombardier, Guillemin, & Ferraz,
2000; Perneger, Leplège, & Etter, 1999) and the present version of the SVS represents only the
most superficial of preliminary steps towards building a measure of SV that may adapted for use
in other cultures. Future research will need to be conducted to establish whether the present
iteration of the SVS translates to different languages and cultural mind-sets.

CONCLUSIONS
Research on SV has mostly focused on demonstrating the construct’s predictive utility,
especially in the realm of economic and conflict research.

However, since its popularity

increased, little research has been done investigating the SV phenomenon itself.

Several

fundamental questions about SV are still left unanswered. However, with the advent of a
measure assessing the magnitude by which a person holds a value as sacred, it should become
easier to explore the phenomenological properties of SV that have thus far been unclear. The
development of a reliable SVS should also lead to more parsimonious predictions regarding SV.
Norming data can be collected and recorded to assess and track the magnitude by which groups
of people hold particular SV. Furthermore, different SV may be compared against each other in
53

a more objective manner than what was previously possible. Further research is needed to
address lingering concerns with the SVS, however the present study represents the beginning of
a definite advancement in the literature on SV.
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Table 1: Original pool of SVS candidate-items with intended SVPM factor
Item content

Intended
Factor

1

When I hear people talk badly about SV I feel a need to defend it.

MO

2

SV is truly special compared to everything else.

RC

3

People who challenge SV are just confused.

MC

4

No one can change my mind about SV.

MC

5

People who joke about SV make me angry.

MO

6

I admire the people who created SV.

MO

7

There is something special about SV that cannot be found elsewhere.

RC

8

I am suspicious of anyone that talks bad about SV.

MO

9

SV is better than all that came before it.

RC

10

Fundamentally, there is nothing that needs to be changed about SV.

RC

11

Things that contradict SV are wrong.

MC

12

It is shameful for people to say that they understand SV when they

MO

really don't.
13

Everyone should be taught about SV at some point.

MC

14

The world would be better if more people truly understood SV.

MC

15

It is silly for people to talk about SV unless they've really studied it.

MC

16

SV is special.

RC

17

SV is far better than anything else.

RC

18

Most people don't understand what SV really means.

MC
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19

I welcome any opportunity to learn more about SV.

MO

20

People who are experts in SV are good role models.

MO

21

There are people who call themselves experts in SV who are not.

MO

22

It would be good to expose people who pretend to understand SV.

MO

23

Some people think SV is something it is not.

MC

24

People who don't truly understand SV should not talk about it.

MC

25

There is bad information about SV.

MC

26

People who make SV look bad should be stopped immediately.

MO

27

There is something wrong with people who try to make SV look bad.

MO

28

I don't understand why anyone would seek to devalue SV.

RC

29

Some people should not be allowed to talk about SV.

MO

30

SV is fundamentally good.

RC

31

It is horrible that people would try to make SV look bad.

MO

32

If I hear people say something wrong about SV, I immediately want to

MO

correct them.
33

It would be bad if SV had challengers.

MO

34

SV should be taught better in the home.

MC

35

People should be taught about SV as soon as possible.

MC

36

It is impossible to know everything about SV.

RC

37

I want to know as much about SV as I can.

MO

38

It would be good to be an expert in SV.

MO

39

People who dedicate their lives to SV are always good people.

RC

40

SV has been very important in my life.

RC
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41

Without SV, my life or career would have been very different.

RC

42

I am grateful for learning about SV when I did.

RC

43

More people should learn about SV.

MC

44

I would feel upset if a loved one made fun of SV.

MO

45

I would feel angry if someone attacked SV.

MO

46

I like being around people who think the same way about SV as I do.

MC

47

I would be uncomfortable around people who hated SV.

MC

48

I don't think I could trust anyone who hated SV.

MC

49

It would be hard to be friends with anyone who hated SV.

MC

50

I would be happy to only be around people that appreciated SV.

MC

51

Some of the greatest people in history would agree with me about SV.

RC

52

Criticizing SV is stupid.

MO

53

SV has caused some amazing things.

RC

54

My life would be worse off without SV.

RC

55

SV is a good source of inspiration.

RC

56

You should choose your words carefully when you talk about SV.

MO

57

I wouldn't judge someone too harshly for getting into a fight to defend

MO

SV.
58

It would be very difficult to improve upon SV.

RC

59

More people should recognize how important SV truly is.

MC

60

Things would be worse off if SV never existed.

RC

61

I am grateful for the person who first introduced me to SV.

MO

62

The best moments of my life have revolved around SV in some way.

MO

66

63

Questioning SV just creates confusion.

MC

64

It is wrong to change basic ideas about SV.

MC

65

It is a waste of time to argue about SV with people who don't

MC

understand it.
MO = Moral Outrage; MC = Moral Cleansing; RC = Reality Constraint.
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Table 2: Results of Horn’s Parallel Analysis on Sacred Values Scale.
Component Adjusted Eigenvalue Unadjusted Eigenvalue Estimated Bias
1

5.392

6.336

0.944

2

4.030

4.861

0.831

3

3.039

3.795

0.757

4

1.778

2.475

0.696

5

1.096

1.733

0.638
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Table 3: Eigenvalues and percent of variance explained by 5-factor SVS
Factor

Eigenvalue

Variance explained

Cumulative variance

1

11.61

33.17%

33.17%

2

3.66

10.47%

43.64%

3

1.86

5.30%

48.94%

4

1.74

4.96%

53.90%

5

1.17

3.35%

57.26%

69

Table 4: The SVS with associated factor loadings from 2 samples
Sample 1

Sample 2

(EFA)

(CFA)

Factor 1: Moral Aversion

0.621

1

I am suspicious of anyone that talks bad about SV.

0.46

0.75

2

It is shameful for people to say that they understand SV

0.53

0.48

0.59

0.72

0.54

0.85

when they really don’t.
3

People who make SV look bad should be stopped
immediately.

4

There is something wrong with people who try to make SV
look bad.

5

It is horrible that people would try to make SV look bad.

0.46

0.84

6

It would be bad if SV had challengers.

0.51

0.57

7

I would feel upset if a loved one made fun of SV.

0.56

0.56

8

I would feel angry if someone attacked SV.

0.69

0.64

9

Criticizing SV is stupid.

0.56

0.76

0.52

0.38

10 You should choose your words carefully when you talk
about SV.
Factor 2: Reality Constraint

0.93

11 There is something special about SV that cannot be found

0.49

0.72

0.48

0.72

elsewhere.
12 SV is special.
70

13 SV is fundamentally good.

0.48

0.87

14 Without SV, my life or career would have been very

0.71

0.71

15 SV has caused some amazing things.

0.72

0.80

16 My life would be worse off without SV.

0.85

0.72

17 SV is a good source of inspiration.

0.53

0.89

18 Things would be worse off if SV never existed.

0.48

0.72

different.

Factor 3: Moral Support

0.81

19 I admire the people who created SV.

0.73

0.65

20 I welcome any opportunity to learn more about SV.

0.71

0.84

21 People who are experts in SV are good role models.

0.43

0.76

22 I want to know as much about SV as I can.

0.85

0.79

23 It would be good to be an expert in SV.

0.61

0.84

24 I am grateful for the person who first introduced me to SV.

0.51

0.69

Factor 4: Moral Induction

0.92

25 Everyone should be taught about SV at some point.

0.90

0.87

26 The world would be better if more people truly understood

0.75

0.90

27 SV should be taught better in the home.

0.59

0.77

28 People should be taught about SV as soon as possible.

0.89

0.88

29 More people should learn about SV.

0.75

0.84

30 More people should recognize how important SV truly is.

0.59

0.90

SV.
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Factor 5: Moral Exclusion

0.62

31 I like being around people who think the same way about

0.41

0.83

32 I would be uncomfortable around people who hated SV.

0.69

0.71

33 I don’t think I could trust anyone who hated SV.

0.63

0.77

34 It would be hard to be friends with anyone who hated SV.

0.90

0.80

35 I would be happy to only be around people that appreciated

0.66

0.67

SV as I do.

SV.
All loadings are significant, all
45

678 9

= 295; 45

678

< 0.01.

= 230.

Bold values denote lower-order factor loadings onto the higher-order SV factor in a CFA on
sample 2.
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Table 5: Reliability estimates of the SVS

Overall

0.97

0.94

MA

0.85

0.85

RC

0.86

0.86

MS

0.85

0.85

MI

0.91

0.91

ME

0.81

0.80
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Table 6: Zero-order correlations of all variables.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1. MA

1

2. RC

.42‡

1

3. MS

.45‡

.60‡

1

4. MI

.44‡

.52‡

.65‡

1

5. ME

.74‡

.48‡

.33‡

.40‡

1

6. SVS

.79‡

.76‡

.78‡

.78‡

.77‡

1

7. AS

.19†

.39‡

.33‡

.23‡

.22‡

.34‡

1

8. MC

.27‡

.25‡

.30‡

.40‡

.19‡

.37‡

.21‡

1

9. NSVS

-.13*

-.18†

-.06

-.06

-.16*

-.15*

.01

-.03

1

10. Tab.

-.13*

-.19†

-.21‡

-.15*

-.18†

-.22‡

-.17†

-.09

.01

1

11. Sym.

.09

.27‡

.18†

.17†

.13*

.21‡

.08

.19‡

-.11

-.12

1

12. Suc.

.10

.15*

.16*

.21‡

.04

.17†

.04

.15*

-.01

-.01

.20‡

1

13. Arg.

.31‡

.24‡

.20‡

.22‡

.36‡

.34‡

.21‡

.26‡

-.11

-.19‡

.14*

.08
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13

1

14

15

16

14. Fig.

.29‡

.09

-.03

-.07

.33‡

.16*

.05

.00

-.06

.01

-.04

-.13

.44‡

1

15. Die

.05

.23‡

.10

-.06

.02

.08

.26‡

.14*

.02

-.05

.01

-.03

.26‡

.44‡

1

16. Pro.

.40‡

.18†

.25‡

.46‡

.35‡

.43‡

.10

.29‡

-.03

-.04

.09

.18†

.31‡

.20‡

.09

1

* < .05; † < .01; ‡significant after Bonferroni multiplicity correction for 16 comparisons.
MA = Moral Aversion, RC = Reality Constraint, MS = Moral Support, MI = Moral Induction, ME = Moral Exclusion, SVS = Sacred
Values Scale, AS = Attitude Strength, MC = Moral Conviction, NSVS = Not Sacred Values Scale, Tab. = Taboo Resolution, Sym. =
Symbolic Resolution, Suc. = Successful Resolution, Arg. = Arguing, Fig. = Fighting, Pro. = Problem Attribution.
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Figure 1: Predicting taboo tradeoffs with only AS and MC.
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Figure 2.: Predicting taboo tradeoffs with AS, MC, and the SVS.
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Figure 3: Predicting taboo tradeoffs with AS, MC, and the 5 SVS factors.
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Figure 4: Predicting willingness to aggress with only AS and MC.
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Figure 5: Predicting willingness to aggress with AS, MC, and the SVS.
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Figure 6: Predicting willingness to aggress with AS, MC, and the 5 SVS factors.
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Appendix A: Attitude Strength Scale
1. How much do you personally care about SV?
Don’t care at all
1

Care a lot

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. How certain are you of your feelings on SV?
Not certain at all
1

Extremely certain

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. Compared to how you feel on other things, how strong are your feelings regarding SV?
Not at all strong
1

Extremely strong

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. How would you rate the amount of thinking you have done about SV?
I don’t think about it at all
1

2

I think about it a lot
3

4

5

6

7

5. I find myself "torn" between the two sides of the issue. Sometimes I more easily see the
positive aspect of SV, but sometimes I more easily see the negative aspects of SV.
(Reverse coded)
Strongly Disagree
1

2

Strongly Agree
3

4
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Appendix B: Moral Conviction Scale
1. To what extent is your position on SV a reflection of your core moral beliefs and conviction?
not at all
1

very much
2

3

4

5

2. To what extent is your position on SV connected to your beliefs about fundamental right and
wrong?
not at all
1

very much
2

3

4

5

3. To what extent is your position on SV based on moral principle?
not at all
1

very much
2

3

4

5

4. To what extent is your position on SV a moral stance?
not at all
1

very much
2

3
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Appendix C: Taboo Tradeoffs Scenario
Suppose you were eating dinner at an expensive restaurant with someone named Sam.
You say “[SV] is pretty important to me,” and Sam replies by saying “that's stupid.” This leads
to an argument between you and Sam.
How satisfied would you be with the following outcomes...
(taboo resolution)

Sam agrees to pay for your meal “to get you to stop arguing.”
Very Dissatisfied
1

(symbolic resolution)

2

Very Satisfied
3

4

5

6

7

Sam politely apologizes for provoking the argument and you pay for
your own meal.
Very Dissatisfied
1

(successful resolution)

2

Very Satisfied
3

4

5

6

7

You agree to pay for Sam’s meal after Sam says “Wow, I think you just
changed my mind!”
Very Dissatisfied
1

2

Very Satisfied
3
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Appendix D: Willingness To Aggress Measures
1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I would be willing to
get into a serious argument to defend SV?
Strongly Disagree
1

Strongly Agree
2

3

4

5

2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I would be willing to
get into a physical fight to defend SV?
Strongly Disagree
1

Strongly Agree
2

3

4

5

3. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I would be willing to
die for SV.
Strongly Disagree
1

Strongly Agree
2

3

4

5

4. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement: people who don't respect SV are
the cause of many problems.
Strongly Disagree
1

Strongly Agree
2

3

85

4

5

Vita
Adon Lee Neria was born and raised in El Paso, Texas. The eldest son of Leopoldo and
Rebecca Neria, he graduated from El Dorado High School in 2008 and enrolled in The
University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) with the Jessie H. & Mary Gibbs fund scholarship. As an
undergraduate, he worked as a volunteer research assistant under Drs. Michael Zárate, Christian
Meissner, and Osvaldo Morera while also volunteering to help immigrants become naturalized
citizens of The U.S. and working 3 jobs as a security guard, event staff, and Peer Leader for
UTEP’s Entering Student Program.

Adon was later elected secretary of Psi Chi, The

International Honor Society in Psychology and accepted a research internship with The National
Center for Border Security and Immigration, a Department of Homeland Security Center of
Excellence. Adon completed an Honors Thesis on the effects of religious argumentation on
submissiveness under Dr. Zárate and graduated summa cum laude with a B.A. in psychology and
a minor in religious studies. As a graduate student, Adon contributed to papers presented to The
Society for Personality and Social Psychology, The American Psychology and Law Society, and
The Society for the Scientific Study of Psychopathy. Adon has also had experience reviewing
article submissions for the journal Personality and Individual Differences and has submitted
several manuscripts detailing research on religious- and morality-based aggression. Adon is
continuing his graduate education as a doctoral student in UTEP’s legal psychology program.
Permanent address:

The University of Texas at El Paso,
Department of Psychology, room 117
500 West University Avenue, El Paso, TX 79968

This thesis was typed by Adon Lee Neria.
86

